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This paper studies competitive equilibria of a production economy with aggregate productiv-
ity shocks. There is a continuum of consumers who face borrowing constraints and individual
labor endowment shocks. The dynamic economy is described in terms of sequences of aggre-
gate distributions. The existence of sequential competitive equilibria is proven and a recursive
characterization is established. In particular, it is shown that for any sequential competitive
equilibrium, there exists a payoﬀ equivalent sequential competitive equilibrium that is generated
by a suitably deﬁned recursive equilibrium with state variables including continuation value.
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It has been documented by a number of empirical studies that the standard representative agent
(or complete markets) model fails to explain many phenomena observed in the data. This leads
to interest in models with heterogeneity and incomplete markets.1 One class of such models,
called the Bewley-style model, has drawn special attention. A typical environment of this model
is described in Krusell and Smith [24]. It features a continuum of consumers making consump-
tion and savings decisions subject to borrowing constraints and idiosyncratic labor endowment
shocks. There is only one asset (capital) serving as a buﬀer against individual shocks. Finally, a
representative ﬁrm makes production decisions with constant-returns-to-scale technology, subject
to aggregate productivity shocks.2
This paper addresses two central open questions. The ﬁrst is whether there exist sequential
competitive equilibria for this type of model. The second is whether there exists a recursive
characterization of sequential competitive equilibria. Krusell and Smith [24] and a number of later
studies pose directly a recursive equilibrium formulation (henceforth, KS-recursive equilibrium)
and then proceed with numerical solutions without studying its existence or the relation to
sequential competitive equilibria. By contrast, I start with the analysis of sequential competitive
equilibria and then move on to recursive characterizations.
The key insight of this paper is to reformulate the Bewley-style model along the lines of
Hildenbrand [18] and Hart et al. [15]. Speciﬁcally, I describe the dynamic economy using se-
quences of aggregate distributions over consumers’ characteristics (individual asset holdings and
the realization of endowment shocks) across the population. These sequences of aggregate dis-
tributions contain the relevant information for equilibrium analysis and they are the principal
objects of study. In particular, given exogenous shocks, aggregate distributions fully determine
prices and aggregate quantities such as aggregate capital. It turns out that this reformulation is
the key to answering the preceding two questions.
To study the existence of sequential competitive equilibria, I begin with a detailed analysis
of a typical individual’s decision problem. After aggregating individual optimal behavior and
deriving the law of motion for aggregate distributions, I establish the existence of a sequential
competitive equilibrium by applying the Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoﬀ Fixed-Point Theorem to
a compact space of sequences of aggregate distributions (Theorem 1). This result is established
1See the survey by Heaton and Lucas [16] and the textbook by Ljunqvist and Sargent [28].
2See [8, 9, 2, 19, 31] for Bewley-style models without aggregate shocks.
1under standard assumptions on preferences and technology and for fairly general individual and
aggregate shock processes. For example, these are assumed to satisfy the Feller property, but
they need not be stationary or Markovian. However, for technical reasons, I assume that the
state space for aggregate shocks is countable.
After imposing the additional assumption that individual and aggregate shocks are time-
homogenous Markov processes, I turn to recursive characterizations of sequential competitive
equilibria. I deﬁne a notion of recursive equilibrium with the state variables consisting of indi-
vidual asset holdings, the realization of individual shocks, the realization of aggregate shocks, the
aggregate distribution, and payoﬀs (expected discounted utilities). Including the ﬁrst three as
state variables is standard. It is also natural to include the aggregate distribution as a state vari-
able because with incomplete markets and heterogeneous consumers, equilibrium prices generally
depend on the distribution of assets across consumers.
Including payoﬀs (or continuation value) as a state variable to make certain decision problems
recursive is a technique widely adopted in the literature on sequential games [11, 5, 7] and on
dynamic contracts [32, 36, 1]. Here this state variable serves as a device for selecting continuation
equilibria when the economy unfolds over time.
Theorem 2 demonstrates that given an initial state, the so deﬁned recursive equilibrium gener-
ates a sequential competitive equilibrium. Theorem 3 demonstrates that a recursive equilibrium
exists. Moreover, for any sequential competitive equilibrium, there is a payoﬀ equivalent sequen-
tial competitive equilibrium that is generated by a recursive equilibrium with the state space
including payoﬀs.
A natural but open question is whether there is a recursive equilibrium with a smaller state
space, for example, the KS-recursive equilibrium that excludes expected payoﬀsa sas t a t ev a r i -
able. For a related ﬁnitely many agents economy, Kubler and Schmedders [25, Theorem 2]
establish the existence of such a recursive equilibrium under the strong condition that the com-
petitive equilibrium is globally unique for all possible initial values. Although one can state
a similar result for the economies studied here, this strong condition cannot be checked from
primitives.
The above analysis must surmount two technical diﬃculties. First, there is a diﬃculty as-
sociated with the presence of aggregate shocks. When they are present, aggregate distributions
are generally random measures that may be correlated with individual shocks. As pointed out
by Bergin and Bernhardt [6], this creates not only diﬃculties of tractability but also concep-
2tual problems associated with the meaning of perfect competition. Thus, I follow Bergin and
Bernhardt [6] and assume the conditional no aggregate uncertainty condition. This requires that,
conditional on the history of aggregate shocks, the aggregate distribution at each date be a con-
stant measure. Second, there are subtle technical problems, pointed out by Judd [20], associated
with an environment that has a continuum of agents, e.g., measurability and the law of large
numbers. This paper deals with these problems in a manner similar to Feldman and Gilles [13]
and Karatzas et al. [21].3
I now review the related literature. There is a growing literature on numerical analysis
of Bewley-style models with aggregate shocks [23, 24, 14, 34]. None of these considers the
theoretical issues studied here. My paper is also related to [11, 4]. There is also an extensive
literature on sequential competitive equilibria for pure-exchange incomplete markets economies
(e.g., [29, 27, 17, 30]). All these papers consider a ﬁnite number of heterogeneous consumers.
The traditional method of proving existence of sequential competitive equilibria is to take limits
of equilibria in truncated economies in which trade stops at some ﬁnite date. This requires two
conditions: First, the existence of sequential competitive equilibria for ﬁnite-horizon economies
must be established. Second, the resulting sequence of equilibria for ﬁnite-horizon economies must
converge to a limit under some suitable topology and this limit is the equilibrium of the original
inﬁnite-horizon economy. By contrast, this paper follows a direct proof strategy. Exploiting
the special feature of the continuum agents environment, I reformulate the economy in terms of
sequences of aggregate distributions. The space of these sequences endowed with some topology
is compact, and hence a topological ﬁxed point theorem can be applied if a suitably deﬁned map
is continuous. A sequential competitive equilibrium is then delivered by a ﬁxed point of this
map. This proof method is much simpler than the traditional one.
In order to ensure compactness, I impose exogenously ﬁxed borrowing constraints, instead
of “non-binding” endogenous borrowing constraints (that is, borrowing constraints that rule out
Ponzi schemes but nothing else). This assumption is also adopted in Duﬃe et al. [11] and the
applied macroeconomics literature. My proof method does not apply to the case of non-binding
endogenous borrowing constraints. Moreover, the existence of continuous recursive equilibria
may not be guaranteed if the exogenous borrowing constraints never bind. This is because under
this condition Krebs [22] proves a nonexistence result for pure-exchange economies with ﬁnitely
many agents. Whether or not a similar nonexistence result holds in the economy studied here is
an open question.
3Also see an alternative approach proposed by Sun [35].
3The recursive characterization in this paper is diﬀerent from Duﬃee ta l . [ 1 1 ]w h os t u d y
ﬁnitely many agents economies.4 The key idea of Duﬃe et al. [11] is to construct an expec-
tations correspondence, which speciﬁes, for each possible current state, the transitions that are
consistent with feasibility and satisﬁes short-run equilibrium conditions. Typically, the expecta-
tions correspondence is constructed using the ﬁrst-order conditions for all agents. This procedure
seems invalid for the continuum agents economies since there is a continuum of ﬁrst-order condi-
tions. Moreover, my result does not require diﬀerentiability assumptions on utility functions, so
ﬁrst-order conditions are not available. My recursive characterization is achieved by ﬁrst deﬁn-
ing an equilibrium correspondence and a related correspondence, and then taking a measurable
selection. An advantage of my recursive characterization is that the state space is smaller than
that in Duﬃe et al. [11] since the latter generally includes all endogenous variables, exogenous
shocks, and signal variables as state variables.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section
3 analyzes the existence of a sequential competitive equilibrium. Section 4 studies recursive
characterizations of sequential competitive equilibria. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are relegated
to an appendix.
2T H E M O D E L
Consider an economy with a large number of inﬁnitely-lived consumers subject to individual
endowment shocks and a single ﬁrm subject to aggregate productivity shocks. This economy is
similar to that studied by Krusell and Smith [24]. Time is discrete and denoted by t =0 ,1,2,....
Uncertainty is represented by a probability space (Ω×Z∞,F,P) on which all stochastic processes
are deﬁned. The state space Ω captures individual shocks, while the state space Z∞ captures
aggregate shocks. Let Z0 = Z, Zt+1 = Z0×Zt, z0 = z0, and denote by zt =( z0,z 1,...,z t) ∈ Zt an
aggregate shock history at time t. Finally, let z∞ =( z0,z 1,z 2,...) ∈ Z∞ b et h ec o m p l e t eh i s t o r y
and z0 = z0 ∈ Z0 be a deterministic constant.
Notation. For any Euclidean subspace D,d e n o t eb yC(D) the space of bounded and continuous
functions on D endowed with the sup-norm, by B(D) the Borel σ-algebra of D,a n db yP(D) the
space of probability measures on B(D) endowed with the weak convergence topology. For any
4One important diﬀerence is that Duﬃe et al [11] study recursive equilibria that admit ergodic distributions,
while I do not consider existence of ergodic distributions. The idea of Duﬃe et al. [11] is pursued further by
Kubler and Schmedders [25, 26] for exchange economies.
4Euclidean sets D and E, B(D) ⊗ B(E) denotes the product σ-algebra.
2.1 Consumers
Consumers are distributed on the interval I =[ 0 ,1] according to the Lebesgue measure φ. Con-
sumers are ex ante identical in that they have the same preferences and their endowment shock
processes are drawn from the same distribution. However, consumers are ex post heterogeneous
in the sense that they experience idiosyncratic endowment shocks.5
Information structure and endowments. Consumer i ∈ I is endowed with one unit of labor
at each date t and a deterministic asset level ai
0 ∈ R++ at the beginning of time 0. Labor
endowment is subject to random shocks represented by a stochastic process (si
t)t≥0 valued in
S ⊂ R+, where si
0 is a deterministic constant. Let S0 = S, St+1 = S0 × St, s0i = si
0, and denote
by sti =( si
0,s i
1,...,s i
t) ∈ St an individual shock history. Let the initial (probability) distribution
of asset holdings and endowment shocks be given by
λ0(A × S)=φ(i ∈ I :( ai
0,s i
0) ∈ A × S),A × S ∈ B(R++) ×B(S).
At the beginning of date t, consumer i observes his labor endowment shock si
t and the ag-
gregate productivity shock zt. His information is represented by a σ-algebra Fi
t generated by
past and current shocks {si
n,z n}t
n=0.6 The following assumptions on the shock processes are
maintained.
Assumption 1 Z ⊂ [z,z] ⊂ R++ is a bounded and countable set endowed with the discrete
topology; S ⊂ R+ is compact.
Assumption 2 For φ-a.e. i,
(a) given the history (sit,zt)=( st,zt), (si
t+1,z t+1) is drawn from the distribution Qt+1(·,s t,zt);
(b) Qt+1(S × Z,·) is measurable for all S × Z ∈ B(S) ×B(Z);
(c) Qt+1 has the Feller property:
R
h(s0,z0)Qt+1(ds0,dz0,·) is a continuous function on St×Zt
for any real-valued, bounded, and continuous function h on S × Z.
5The extension to the case of ex ante heterogeneous consumers is in the working paper version of the paper,
which is available upon request.
6Alternatively, one can consider the case where each consumer observes the aggregate shocks after he makes
choices so that F
i




n=0,z −1 is null.
5Remark 2.1 It merits emphasis that the state space of aggregate shocks is assumed to be count-
able, which avoids measurability problems that may arise in dynamic programming. See [7] for
the treatment when this space is uncountable.
Consumption Space. There is a single good. A consumption plan ci ≡ (ci
t)∞
t=0 for consumer i
is a nonnegative real-valued process such that ci
t is Fi
t-measurable.7 Denote by Ci the set of all
consumption plans for consumer i.
Budget and borrowing constraints. An asset accumulation plan (ai
t+1)t≥0 for consumer i is a
real-valued process such that ai
t+1 is Fi
t-measurable.
In each period t,c o n s u m e ri consumes ci
t and accumulates assets ai








where rt is the rental rate and wt is the wage rate. For simplicity, assume that all consumers
cannot borrow so that:
ai
t+1 ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I. (2)
Finally, let A =[ 0 ,∞), and denote by Ai the set of all asset accumulation plans of consumer
i that satisfy the budget constraint (1) and the borrowing constraint (2). A consumption plan
c ∈ Ci corresponding to an asset accumulation plan a ∈ Ai is called (budget) feasible.











where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and u : R+ → R is the felicity function satisfying:
Assumption 3 The function u is bounded, continuous, and strictly concave.






7Because of this measurability, I may write the value of c
i
t at state (ω,z




Similar notation applies to other adapted processes.
6The plans (ci
t)t≥0 and (ai




Allocation. An allocation ((ci
t,a i
t+1)t≥0)i∈I is a collection of consumption and asset accumulation
plans (ci
t,a i
t+1)t≥0,i∈ I. An allocation ((ci
t,a i
t+1)t≥0)i∈I is admissible if both ci
t = ct(i,ω,zt) and
ai
t+1 = at+1(i,ω,zt) are B(I)⊗Ft-measurable where Ft is the smallest σ-algebra containing Fi
t for
all i ∈ I, Ft = ∨i∈IFi
t,t≥ 0. This measurability requirement ensures certain integrals are well




t-measurable for all ﬁxed i ∈ I, they are also Ft-measurable. Thus, the essential content
of admissibility is that ci
t and ai
t+1 must be B(I)-measurable for each ﬁxed (ω,zt) ∈ Ω × Zt.T o
ensure that admissible allocations exist, I assume:8
Assumption 4 For each t, st : I × Ω × Z∞ → S is B(I) ⊗ Ft-measurable.
2.2 The Firm
There is a single ﬁrm renting capital at (net) rate rt and hiring labor at wage wt at date t. It
produces output Yt with the constant-returns-to-scale technology F : R+ × R+→ R+ :
Yt = ztF(Kt,N t)+( 1− δ)Kt,
where aggregate capital Kt is Ft−1-measurable, aggregate labor Nt is Ft-measurable, and δ ∈
(0,1) is the depreciation rate. Capital is transformed from consumers’ accumulated assets and
aggregate labor supply Nt is given exogenously.
Assumption 5 (a) Nt is uniformly bounded, 0 ≤ Nt ≤ b N. (b) F is homogeneous of degree one,
strictly increasing, strictly concave, continuously diﬀerentiable, and satisﬁes: F(0,·)=F(·,0) =
0, limK→0 F1(K, b N)=∞,a n dlimK→∞ F1(K, b N)=0 .
Remark 2.2 This assumption implies that there is a maximal sustainable capital stock b K which
is given by the unique solution to the equation zF(K, b N)=δK.
By Assumption 5, competitive proﬁt maximization implies that for all t ≥ 0,
rt = ztF1(Kt,N t) − δ, (4)
wt = ztF2(Kt,N t). (5)
8The proof of existence of admissible allocations follows from a similar argument in [21]. So I omit it.
7Note that prices rt and wt are Ft-measurable.
2.3 Competitive Equilibrium
I ﬁrst deﬁne sequential competitive equilibrium in the standard way.
Deﬁnition 1. As e q u e n t i a lc o m p e t i t i v ee q u i l i b r i u m(((ai
t+1,c i
t)t≥0)i∈I,(rt,w t)t≥0) consists of an
admissible allocation ((ai
t+1,c i
t)t≥0)i∈I and price processes (rt,w t)t≥0 such that: (i) Given prices
(wt,r t)t≥0, (ai
t+1,c i
t)t≥0 solves problem (3) for φ-a.e. i. (ii) Given prices (wt,r t)t≥0,t h eﬁrm
maximizes proﬁts so that (4) and (5) are satisﬁed for all t ≥ 0. (iii) Markets clear, i.e., for all












To analyze the existence and properties of sequential competitive equilibria, it is important to
introduce the notion of aggregate distribution. Such a distribution is deﬁned over the individual
states across the population. An individual state is a pair of individual asset holdings and the
history of individual shocks. More formally, if individual asset holdings and the shock history at
date t ≥ 0 are ai
t and sti, respectively, i ∈ I, then the aggregate distribution, λt ∈ P(A × St),i s
deﬁned by:
λt(A × B)=φ(i ∈ I :( at(i),s t(i)) ∈ A × B),A × B ∈ B(A) ×B(St). (8)
Thus, λt(A × B) is the measure of consumers whose asset holdings and shock histories at date t






Any aggregate variable can be written as an expectation with respect to the so deﬁned





















tφ(di)=( 1+rt)Kt + wtNt − Kt+1.
8The last equation follows from integration of Eq. ( 1 ) . I ti m p l i e st h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n t( 7 )
by the homogeneity of F and (4)-(5). Finally, Eq. (4)-(5) induce pricing functions rt :
P(A × S
t) × Z → R and wt : P(A × S



















From the above discussion, conclude that aggregate distributions contain all the relevant
information for equilibrium analysis. Henceforth, they will be the focus of study.
3 EXISTENCE OF COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
I begin by analyzing a single consumer’s decision problem. I then discuss aggregation. I ﬁnally
present the existence result. Notice that the model reduces to the case without aggregate shocks
when Z contains only one element. Thus, all results to follow are valid for this case.9
3.1 The One-Person Decision Problem
Consider a single consumer’s decision problem, given a sequence of aggregate distributions µ =
{λt}t≥0. So the consumer index is suppressed.
In general, the aggregate distribution at date t is a measurable function of the individual-
relevant state ω and the history of aggregate shocks zt (see (8)). However, Section 3.2 will
show that under some conditions, equilibrium aggregate distributions do not depend on the
individual-relevant state ω. Therefore, this subsection assumes that the aggregate distribution
λt is a function from the set of histories of aggregate shocks Zt to P(A × St). Let P(A × St)Zt
denote the set of such functions endowed with the product (or pointwise convergence) topology.
Let P∞(A × S) ≡ ×∞
t=0P(A × St)Zt
. Then µ is an element in P∞(A × S).
It is convenient to analyze an individual’s consumption and savings decisions by dynamic
programming. Let Vt(at,s t,zt,µ) denote the maximized expected discounted utility of the con-
sumer at date t, when his asset holdings are at and the sequence of aggregate distributions is µ,
given the individual shock history st and the aggregate shock history zt. Then, at date t ≥ 0,
9Aiyagari [2] and Miao [31] study stationary equilibria for economies without aggregate shocks.
9the consumer solves the following dynamic programming problem:
Vt(at,s t,zt,µ)= s u p
at+1∈Γ(at,st,zt,λt(zt))




Vt+1(at+1,s t+1,zt+1,µ)Qt+1(dst+1,dz t+1,s t,zt), (11)
where
Γ(at,s t,z t,λ t(zt)) = [0,(1 + rt(λt(zt),z t))at + wt(λt(zt),z t)st].
The associated policy correspondence is deﬁned by gt+1 : A × St × Zt ×P ∞(A × S) → A,w i t h
gt+1(at,s t,zt,µ) ⊂ Γ(at,s t,z t,λ t(zt)). If gt+1 is single-valued, it is called a policy function. If
gt+1(at,s t,zt,µ) is the set of maximizers of problem (11), it is called an optimal policy corre-
spondence.
To understand problem (11), consider an n-period truncation. At date n, the consumer solves
the following problem:
V n
n (an,s n,zn,λ n(zn)) = max
a0∈Γ(an,sn,zn,λn(zn))
u((1 + rn(λn(zn),z n)an + wn(λn(zn),z n)sn − a0).
At date n − 1, by the principle of optimally, the consumer solves the following problem:
V n
n−1(an−1,s n−1,zn−1,λ n−1(zn−1),λ n)= m a x
a0∈Γ(an−1,sn−1,zn−1,λn−1(zn−1))





n (a0,s n,zn,λ n(zn))Qn(dzn,ds n,s n−1,zn−1).
In general, at any date 0 ≤ t ≤ n, the consumer solves the problem:
V n
t (at,s t,zt,λ t(zt),λ t+1,...,λ n)
=m a x
a0∈Γ(at,st,zt,λt(zt))





t+1(a0,s t+1,zt+1,λ t+1(zt+1),λ t+2,...,λ n)Qt+1(dzt+1,ds t+1,s t,zt).
Problem (11) corresponds to the limiting case as n →∞ .
More formally, let V denote the set of uniformly bounded and continuous real-valued functions
on A × St × Zt ×P ∞(A × S).L e t V∞ denote the set of sequences v =( v0,v 1,v 2,....) of such
functions. Note that V∞ is a complete metric space if endowed with the norm






10Then an application of the Contraction Mapping Theorem yields:
Lemma 1. Given Assumptions 1-5, then there is a unique sequence of functions {Vt}t≥0 ∈ V∞
and a unique sequence of continuous policy functions {gt+1}t≥0 solving (11).
3.2 Aggregation and the Law of Motion for Aggregate Distributions
This subsection studies the question of aggregation of individual behavior to form aggregate
behavior and derives the law of motion for the aggregate distributions induced by the sequences
of individual optimal policy functions {gt+1}t≥0 and individual shocks (si
t)t≥0.
In perfectly competitive markets, each consumer has no inﬂuence over prices, and all con-
sumers together determine prices. The continuum formulation and a suitable law of large numbers
make this possible. To see this, recall that the aggregate distribution at date t, λt(ω,zt), is deﬁned
in (8). It is a random measure that depends on the state (ω,zt). In models without aggregate
shocks (e.g., [2] and [31]), perfect competition implies that equilibrium aggregate distributions
must be deterministic. The latter can be achieved by assuming a no aggregate uncertainty con-
dition on the shock processes and the underlying probability spaces, introduced in [6, Deﬁnition
1] for models of anonymous sequential games. Feldman and Gilles’ construction [13, Proposition
2] shows that this condition is not vacuous and their construction is applied directly by Miao
[31] to a Bewley-style model without aggregate shocks.
Say that a process X =( Xt)t≥0,X t : I × Ω → D,w h e r eD is a Euclidean space and Xt
is jointly measurable, satisﬁes no aggregate uncertainty if there exists a nonrandom measure ν
such that φ(i ∈ I : X(i,ω) ∈ D)=ν(D),D∈ B(D), for P-a.e. ω.10 Note that whether or not
a process X has the no aggregate uncertainty property depends on the underlying probability
space. The implication of the no aggregate uncertainty condition is that φ(i ∈ I : X(i,ω) ∈
D)=P(ω ∈ Ω : X(i,ω) ∈ D) if each Xi is drawn from the same distribution. In this case, the
measure ν is in fact this common distribution. Thus, the empirical distribution of a sample of
random variables (Xi
t)i∈I is the same as the theoretical distribution from which all these random
variables are drawn.
To accommodate the case where aggregate shocks are present, I follow [6] and introduce a
notion of conditional no aggregate uncertainty. A process X =( Xt)t≥0,X t : I × Ω × Z∞ → D,
10Note that this deﬁnition is slightly diﬀerent from [6, Deﬁnition 1].
11satisﬁes the conditional no aggregate uncertainty condition if given the history of aggregate shocks
z∞ ∈ Z∞, X satisﬁes the no aggregate uncertainty condition. I now assume:
Assumption 6 The individual shock process si =( si
t)t≥0,s t : I × Ω × Z∞ → S,s a t i s ﬁes the
conditional no aggregate uncertainty condition relative to the probability space (Ω × Z∞,F,P).
This assumption implies that given the history z∞,
φ(i ∈ I : s(i,ω,z∞) ∈ B)=Pz(ω ∈ Ω : si(ω,z∞) ∈ B),B∈ B(S∞),
where Pz is the conditional measure on Ω given z∞. Thus, conditional on the history of aggregate











t(ω,zt)Pz(dω),∀t ≥ 0,∀i ∈ I,
which is deterministic. This property, along with the labor market clearing condition (6), puts a
restriction on aggregate labor supply Nt; namely, Nt must depend on zt only.
Assumption 6 permits derivation of the law of motion for aggregate distributions, as I now
s h o w .B e c a u s ec o n s u m e r sa r ee xa n t ei d e n t i c a l ,t h e y will choose the same optimal asset accumula-
tion policy. Thus, given the individual state (ai
t,s ti), the history of aggregate shocks zt, and the se-




Fixing a history of shocks zt+1 and using (8) and Bayes’ Rule, one can derive that for any
Borel sets A ∈ B(A), B = B1×B2 ∈ B(S
t) ×B(S),




φ(i ∈ I :( gt+1(ai
t,s ti,zt,µ),s t+1,i) ∈ A × B | (ai
t,s ti)=( at,s t))
·φ(i ∈ I :( ai




φ(i ∈ I :( gt+1(at,s t,zt,µ),s i




1A(g(a,st,zt,µ))φ(i ∈ I : st+1(i,ω,zt+1) ∈ B2 | sti = st)λt(dat,ds t)
Applying the conditional no aggregate uncertainty condition, one obtains:




12This implies that, conditional on the history of aggregate shocks zt+1 and the history of individual
shocks st,φ (i ∈ I : st+1(i,ω,zt+1) ∈ B2 | sti = st) does not depend on individual uncertainty.
Therefore, if λ0 is a nonrandom measure, then the conditional no aggregate uncertainty condition
implies that, conditional on any history of aggregate shocks, the aggregate distribution at each
date does not depend on individual uncertainty. Thus, the date t aggregate distribution λt can
be identiﬁed as a map from Zt to P(A × St), as assumed in Section 3.1.
The above discussion is summarized in the following Lemma:
Lemma 2. Under the conditional no aggregate uncertainty condition Assumption 6, along a
history of aggregate shocks z∞ =( z0,z 1,...), the sequence of equilibrium aggregate distributions








for any Borel sets A ∈ B(A) and B = B1×B2 ∈ B(S
t)×B(S).
3.3 The Existence Theorem
I now state one main result of the paper.
Theorem 1. Given Assumptions 1-6, there exists a sequential competitive equilibrium. More-
over, the set of equilibrium sequences of aggregate distributions are compact.





t≥0 ∈ P∞(A × S) along a history of aggregate shocks z∞. Denote by P0
∞(A × S)




A sequence of optimal asset accumulation policies {gt+1}t≥0 can be derived from Lemma 1. Deﬁne






e λt+1(zt+1)(A × B)=
Z
A×B1
1A(gt+1(at,s t,zt,µ))Qt+1(B2,z t+1,s t,zt)λt(dat,ds t), (12)
for all Borel sets A ∈ B(A) and B = B1 × B2 ∈ B(St) ×B(S),t≥ 0. Furthermore, deﬁne a
map ψ : P0
∞(A × S) → P0




13induces a sequential competitive equilibrium (((ai
t+1,c i
t)t≥0)i∈I,(rt,w t)t≥0). Speciﬁcally, for any






















0,z 0, and λ∗
0 = λ0 are given.
However, P0
∞(A × S) is not a compact set since A is not compact. To apply the Brouwer-
Schauder-Tychonoﬀ Fixed-Point Theorem [3, Corollary 16.52], one needs the domain of ψ to be
compact. Thus, I construct another compact set so that ψ is a self-map in this domain.
The set is constructed as follows. Because of Assumption 5 and the resource constraint,
one can restrict attention to the set of sequences of aggregate distributions (λt)t≥0 such that
Kt =
R
A×St aλt(da,dst) ≤ b K. Then let
b P(A × St)(zt)=
½
λ(zt) ∈ P(A × St):
Z
A×St






b P∞(A × S)=×∞
t=0 ×zt∈Zt b P(A × St)(zt).
Lemma 3. b P∞(A × S) is a compact and convex subset of a locally convex Hausdorﬀ space.
One can now apply the Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoﬀ Fixed-Point Theorem to the map ψ :
b P∞(A × S) → b P∞(A × S). Any ﬁxed point induces a competitive equilibrium.
4 RECURSIVE CHARACTERIZATION
To permit a recursive characterization of sequential competitive equilibria, I make two stationarity
assumptions:
Assumption 7 Qt+1(S × Z,st,zt)=Q(S × Z,st,z t) for all t ≥ 0 and S × Z ∈ B(S)×B(Z).
Assumption 8 Aggregate labor endowments at any date t ≥ 0 is given by a measurable function
N : Zt → (0, b N].
14Given these assumptions, the economy is the same as that studied by Krusell and Smith [24].
These two assumptions also imply that past histories of individual shocks do not aﬀect current
decisions. Thus, the aggregate distribution of asset holdings and individual shocks at date t, λt,
can be deﬁned as
λt(A × B)=φ(i ∈ I :( ai
t,s i
t) ∈ A × B),A × B ∈ B(A) ×B(S). (13)
The set of all aggregate distributions is denoted by P∞(A × S)=×∞
t=0P(A × S)Zt
.
Under Assumptions 1-8, the pricing functions (4)-(5) become r : P(A × S)×Z → R, w :



















Moreover, a typical consumer’s decision problem at date t (11) can be rewritten as the following
dynamic programming equation:
V (at,s t,z t,(λτ)τ≥t)= s u p
a0∈Γ(at,st,zt,λt)




V (a0,s 0,z0,(λτ)τ≥t+1)Q(ds0,dz0,s t,z t).
This problem is studied in Lemma 4 below.
To derive a recursive characterization, it is important to select state variables. A current state
must be a suﬃcient statistic for the future evolution of the system. With incomplete markets
and heterogeneous consumers, equilibrium prices generally depend on the distribution of assets
across the consumers. Thus, it is natural to include the aggregate distribution as a state variable.
The question is whether it constitutes a suﬃcient endogenous aggregate state. To answer this
question, I deﬁne a notion of equilibrium correspondence in the next subsection.
4.1 Equilibrium Correspondence
I ﬁrst provide a lemma characterizing an equilibrium sequence of aggregate distributions.
Lemma 4. Let Assumptions 1-8 hold. Then:
(i) There is a unique continuous and bounded function V : A × S× Z×P ∞(A × S) → R and
a unique continuous policy function g : A × S × Z ×P ∞(A × S) → A solving problem (16).
15(ii) Any equilibrium sequence of aggregate distributions (λt)t≥0 is characterized by the follow-







1A(g(at,s t,z t,(λτ)τ≥t))Q(B,zt+1,s t,z t)λt(zt)(dat,ds t), (18)
where λ0 is given.
Eq. (17) is the labor market clearing condition. Eq. (18) says that the evolution of (λt)t≥0
must be consistent with consumers’ optimal behavior. It embodies rational expectations.
In o wd e ﬁne an equilibrium correspondence E : Z ×P(A × S) → P∞(A × S),w h e r eE(z,λ) is
the set of equilibrium sequences of aggregate distributions associated with an initial aggregate
state (z,λ). Theorem 1 shows that E(z,λ) is nonempty and compact so that the correspondence
E is well deﬁned. An important property of the equilibrium correspondence is described in the
following lemma.
Lemma 5. Under Assumptions 1-8, the equilibrium correspondence E is upper hemicontinuous.
Because the equilibrium correspondence is generally not single-valued, there may be multiple
equilibrium trajectories that are consistent with a given initial aggregate distribution and a given
initial value of aggregate shock. This implies that the current aggregate distribution is typically
not a suﬃcient (endogenous) statistic for the future evolution of the aggregate distributions (or
prices). This motivates the need for additional state variables.
Before I turn to recursive characterizations in the next subsection, I deﬁne another corre-
spondence. Let
X = {(z,λ,v) ∈ Z×P(A × S) × C(A × S × Z ×P(A × S)) :
∃µ ∈ E(z,λ),v (·,z,λ)=V (·,z,µ))}.
Deﬁne a correspondence ϕ : X → P∞(A × S) as
ϕ(z,λ,v)={µ ∈ E(z,λ):v(·,z,λ)=V (·,z,µ)}. (19)
Thus, the correspondence ϕ assigns to any point (z,λ,v) ∈ X the set of equilibrium sequences of
aggregate distributions µ with the property that the expected payoﬀ to consumer i is v(a,s,z,λ)
16when the initial state is (ai
0,s i
0,z 0,λ 0)=( a,s,z,λ). Since E(z,λ) is nonempty by Theorem 1, the
correspondence ϕ is well deﬁned. Using Lemma 5, one can establish the following lemma, which
is important for the recursive characterization studied in the next subsection.
Lemma 6. Under Assumptions 1-8, the correspondence ϕ is upper hemicontinuous.
4.2 Recursive Equilibria
I now turn to recursive characterization of sequential competitive equilibria. The key to recursive
characterization is the selection of state variables. Inspired by the literature on sequential games
[11, 5, 7] and on dynamic contracts [32, 36, 1], I include the expected payoﬀs (expected discounted
utilities) as an additional endogenous state variable and deﬁne a recursive equilibrium as follows.
Deﬁnition 2. A recursive (competitive) equilibrium ((f,Tv,G),(r,w)) consists of a measurable
policy function f : A × S×Z×P(A × S) × C(A × S × Z ×P(A × S)) → A, a measurable map
Tv : Z×P(A × S) × C(A × S × Z ×P(A × S)) → C(A × S × Z ×P(A × S)), a measurable map
G : Z×P(A × S)×C(A × S × Z ×P(A × S)) × Z → P(A × S), and measurable pricing functions
r : P(A × S)×Z → R and w : P(A × S)×Z → R+ such that:
(i) Given the pricing functions r and w, the policy function f solves the following problem
v(a,s,z,λ)= s u p
a0∈Γ(a,s,z,λ)




where v ∈ C(A × S × Z ×P(A × S)) and
v0(·)=Tv(z,λ,v)(·) ∈ C(A × S × Z ×P(A × S)) and λ0 = G(z,λ,v,z0).
(ii) The ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts so that r and w satisfy (14)-(15).
(iii) The sequence of aggregate distributions induced by G is such that labor markets clear:
R
A×S sλt(da,ds)=N(zt), ∀zt ∈ Zt, where λt+1 = G(zt,λ t,v t,z t+1) and λ0 is given.
(iv) The law of motion for aggregate distributions G is generated by the individual optimal





17Remark 4.1 If individual shocks and aggregate shocks are independent, then Q(B,z0,s,z) does
not depend on z0 so that G does not depend on z0. In this case, λ0 = G(z,λ,v). Note that
requirement (iv) embodies rational expectations. It is justiﬁed by the analysis in Section 3.2 and
Lemmas 2 and 4.
The following theorem shows that given an initial state, a recursive equilibrium generates a
sequential competitive equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Let Assumptions 1-8 hold. Given the initial state ((ai
0,s i
0)i∈I,z 0,λ 0,v 0), ar e c u r s i v e
equilibrium ((f,Tv,G),r,w) generates a sequential competitive equilibrium (((ai
t+1,c i
t)t≥0)i∈I,
(rt,w t)t≥0) in which consumer i’s expected discounted utilities are given by v0(ai
0,s i
0,z 0,λ 0).
The dynamics of the sequential competitive equilibrium (((ai
t+1,c i
t)t≥0)i∈I,(rt,w t)t≥0) is de-
scribed as follows. Given the initial state ((ai
0,s i
0)i∈I,z 0,λ 0,v 0), the interest rate and the wage




0,z 0,λ 0,v 0) and consumes the remaining wealth ci
0 =( 1 + r0)ai
0+w0si
0−ai
1. At date 1,
when the realizations of individual shocks and aggregate shocks are (si
1)i∈I and z1, t h ed a t e1s t a t e
((ai
1,s i
1)i∈I,z 1,λ 1,v 1) is determined by the maps (f,G,Tv). In particular, λ1 = G(z0,λ 0,v 0,z 1),
v1 = Tv(z0,λ 0,v 0). T h e nt h ed a t e1p r i c e sa r eg i v e nb yr1 = r(λ1,z 1) and w1 = w(λ1,z 1). Under
these prices, consumer i accumulates assets ai
2 = f(ai
1,s i





2. The state then moves to date 2, and so on. Finally,
the expected payoﬀ to consumer i in the equilibrium (((ai
t+1,c i




Does a recursive equilibrium deﬁned earlier exist? Can any sequential competitive equilibrium
be generated by such a recursive equilibrium? The following theorem answers these questions.
Theorem 3. Under Assumptions 1-8, there exists a recursive equilibrium. Moreover, for any
competitive equilibrium (((ai
t+1,c i
t)t≥0)i∈I, (rt,w t)t≥0) with the sequence of aggregate distribu-
tions µ∗, there exists a payoﬀ equivalent competitive equilibrium that is generated by a recursive
equilibrium.
This theorem implies that a recursive equilibrium exists. Moreover, any payoﬀ i m p l i e db ya
sequential competitive equilibrium can be generated by a recursive equilibrium. Notice that the
18sequential competitive equilibrium generated by the recursive equilibrium may be diﬀerent from
the equilibrium (((ai
t+1,c i
t)t≥0)i∈I, (rt,w t)t≥0). But they imply the same expected discounted
utilities.
The key to the proof of the theorem is to construct an equilibrium sequence of aggregate
distributions µ =( λt)t≥0 such that its law of motion satisﬁes (iv) in Deﬁnition 2. This is
achieved by taking a measurable selection ξ from the correspondence ϕ. Then λt+1 is obtained
as the second component of ξ(zt,λ t,v t). The payoﬀ vt+1(at+1,s t+1,z t+1,λ t+1) is obtained as
the continuation utility at date t +1 ,V(at+1,s t+1,z t+1,ξ(zt,λ t,v t)), implied by the equilibrium
sequence of aggregate distributions ξ(zt,λ t,v t) when the economy starts at date t. This reﬂects
rational expectations formed at the previous date. Moreover, vt+1 serves as a device to select the
‘continuation’ equilibrium ξ(zt+1,λ t+1,v t+1) when the economy starts at date t+1. Finally, since
the dynamics of the constructed equilibrium is stationary, the maps (f,Tv,G) can be constructed
so that a recursive equilibrium is obtained.
Turn to another recursive characterization proposed by Krusell and Smith [24], which assumes
that the aggregate distribution does constitute a suﬃcient endogenous (aggregate) state.
Deﬁnition 3. A KS-recursive (competitive) equilibrium ((v,h,H),(r,w)) consists of a value
function v : A×S × Z ×P(A × S) → R, a measurable policy function h : A×S × Z ×P(A × S) → A,
am e a s u r a b l em a pH : P(A × S) × Z
2 → P(A × S), and measurable pricing functions r : P(A × S)
×Z → R and w : P(A × S)×Z → R+ such that:
(i) Given the function H and the pricing functions r and w, v and h solve the problem:
v(a,s,z,λ)= s u p
a0∈Γ(a,s,z,λ)





subject to λ0 = H(λ,z,z0).
(ii) The ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts so that r and w satisfy (14)-(15).
(iii) The sequence of aggregate distributions induced by H is such that labor markets clear:
R
A×S sλt(da,ds)=N(zt), ∀zt ∈ Zt, where λt+1 = H(λt,z t,z t+1) and λ0 is given.
(iv) The law of motion for aggregate distributions H is generated by the individual optimal





It is straightforward to show that a KS-recursive equilibrium generates a sequential compet-
itive equilibrium. Does a KS-recursive equilibrium exist? For a related ﬁnitely many agents
economy, Kubler and Schmedders [25, Theorem 2] establish the existence of such a recursive
equilibrium under the strong condition that the competitive equilibrium is globally unique for
all possible initial values. Although one can state a similar result for the economies studied
here, this strong condition cannot be checked from primitives. It is an open question whether a
KS-recursive equilibrium exists without this condition.
5C O N C L U S I O N
In this paper, I describe the Bewley-style model with aggregate shocks in terms of sequences of
aggregate distributions. Using this formulation, I resolve two central open questions. Speciﬁ-
cally, I establish the existence of a sequential competitive equilibrium and provide a recursive
characterization. There are still some open questions remaining. For example, how should one
design eﬃcient numerical methods to solve Bewley models with aggregate shocks? Does there
exist a recursive equilibrium deﬁned in Krusell and Smith [24]? I leave these questions for future
research.
11This condition can be justiﬁed by a similar analysis to that in section 3.2.
20AA p p e n d i x
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :
Deﬁne an operator T on V∞ as follows. For v ∈ V∞, let tth component of Tv(at,s t,zt,µ) be the
expression
(Tv)t(at,s t,zt,µ)= m a x
at+1∈Γ(at,st,zt,λt(zt))




vt+1(at+1,s t+1,zt+1,µ)Qt+1(dst+1,dz t+1,s t,zt), (22)
I ﬁrst show that Tv ∈ V∞. It is immediate that each (Tv)t is bounded. To show conti-
nuity of (Tv)t, I apply the Maximum Theorem. Consider a sequence (at+1,a t,s t,zt,µ)n →
(at+1,a t,s t,zt,µ),n=1 ,2,....Since Z is countable, (zt)n = zt for all n large enough. By (9)-(10)
and the deﬁnition of weak convergence, rt(λn
t ((zt)n),(zt)n) → rt(λt(zt),z t), wt(λn
t ((zt)n),(zt)n) →
wt(λt(zt),z t). Thus, Γ is a continuous correspondence. Moreover, the ﬁrst term on the right-hand
side of (22) is continuous in (at+1,a t,s t,zt,µ) since u is continuous.
Turn to continuity of the second term. For n suﬃciently large,
Z
S×Z




vt+1((at+1)n,(st)n,s t+1,zt+1,µ n)Qt+1(dst+1,dz t+1,(st)n,zt).













¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
Z
S×Z















vt+1(at+1,s t+1,zt+1,µ)Qt+1(dst+1,dz t+1,s t,zt)
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯.
Since ((at+1)n,(st)n,s t+1,zt+1,µ n) → (at+1,s t+1,zt+1,µ), there is a compact set D ⊂ A × St+1×
Zt+1 ×P ∞(A × S) such that ((at+1)n,(st)n,s t+1,zt+1,µ n) ∈ D for all n large enough, and
21(at+1,s t+1,zt+1,µ) ∈ D. Since vt+1 is continuous, it is uniformly continuous on D. Thus, for
every ε>0, there exists N>1 such that for all n>N ,s t+1 ∈ S, and zt+1 ∈ Zt+1,
¯
¯vt+1((at+1)n,(st)n,s t+1,zt+1,µ n) − vt+1(at+1,s t+1,zt+1,µ)
¯
¯ <ε .
This implies that the ﬁrst absolute value in (23) vanishes as n →∞ . The second absolute value
also vanishes by the Feller property.
Next, T is a contraction by a straightforward application of the Blackwell Theorem adapted
to the inﬁnite dimensional space V∞ (see [12, Lamma A.1]). Finally, applying the Contraction
Mapping Theorem and the Maximum Theorem yields the desired results.
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 :
See the main text.
P r o o fo fL e m m a3 :
I ﬁrst show b P(A × St) is compact. Then b P∞(A × St) is also compact under the product topology.







aλ(da,dst) ≥ a0λ([a0,∞) × St).
This implies that for any ε>0, there exists an a0 large enough such that λ([a0,∞) × St) <ε .
Thus, b P(A × St) is tight and hence relatively compact (see [3, Theorem 14.22]). Furthermore,
b P(A × St) is closed with respect to the weak convergence topology. It follows that b P(A × St) is
compact.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 :
I verify that the map ψ : b P∞(A × S) → P∞(A × S) deﬁned in Section 3.3 satisﬁes the conditions
of the Brouwer-Schauder-Tychonoﬀ Fixed Point Theorem ([3, Corollary 16.52]). I ﬁrst show
that ψ maps from b P∞(A × S) into itself. Let µ =( λ0,λ 1,...) ∈ b P∞(A × S). Then ψ(µ)=e µ =










[(1 + rt(λt,z t))at + wt(λt,z t)st]λt(dat,ds t)
=( 1 + rt(λt,z t))Kt + wt(λt,z t)Nt
=( 1 − δ)Kt + ztF(Kt,N t)
≤ (1 − δ) b K + zF( b K, b N)= b K.
Thus, ψ(µ) ∈ b P∞(A × S).
Finally, I show that ψ is continuous. Fix a history of aggregate shocks z∞. Let the sequence








,n=1 ,2,.... By deﬁnition of ψ, e λ
n
0 = λn
0 → λ0 = e λ0. For any t ≥ 0,i tf o l l o w s






















h(at,s t+1)e λt+1(dat,ds t+1),
where I have used the facts that λn
t converges to λt weakly and that gt+1 is continuous in at,s t,
and µn by Lemma 1. Thus, e λ
n
t+1 converges to λt+1 weakly for all t ≥ 0. This implies that e µn → e µ,
and hence ψ is continuous.
P r o o fo fL e m m a4 :
(i) Let W denote the set of uniformly bounded and continuous real-valued functions on A × S×
Z ×P ∞(A × S), where P∞(A × S)=×∞
t=0P(A × S)Zt
.L e t W∞ denote the set of sequences
W =( W,W,W,....) of such functions. Note that W∞ is a complete metric space if endowed with
the norm
¯ ¯¯ ¯W
¯ ¯¯ ¯ =s u p
(a,s,z,µ)
|W(a,s,z,µ)|.
23Let the pricing functions r : P(A × S)×Z → R and w : P(A × S)×Z → R+ be deﬁned as in
(14)-(15).
Next, let W =( W,W,...) ∈ W∞. Given any sequence of aggregate distributions (λt)t≥0,
rewrite problem (22) as
(TW)t(at,s t,z t,(λτ)τ≥t)= s u p
at+1∈Γ(at,st,zt,λt)




W(at+1,s t+1,z t+1,(λτ)τ≥t+1)Q(dst+1,dz t+1,s t,z t),
where I have applied Assumptions 7-8. Since the expression on the right side of the above equation
is a time invariant function of (at,s t,z t,(λτ)τ≥t), the operator T maps a sequence of time invariant
function to another sequence of time invariant function. Thus, the ﬁxed point of T is a sequence
of time invariant function, denoted by (V,V,....) where V : A × S × Z ×P ∞(A × S) → R is
continuous. The corresponding sequence of optimal policies is also time invariant, denoted by
(g,g,...) where g : A × S × Z ×P ∞(A × S) → R. Moreover, g is continuous by the Maximum
Theorem.
Part (ii) follows from Lemma 2 and Assumptions 7-8.
P r o o fo fL e m m a5 :
Using a similar argument surrounding Lemma 3, one can restrict the range of the correspondence
E to be a compact space. By Theorem 1, E is closed-valued. Thus, to show that E is upper
hemicontinuous, it suﬃces to show that E has a closed graph by the Closed Graph Theorem [3,
Theorem 16.12].
Let (zn,λ n) b eas e q u e n c ec o n v e r g i n gt o(z,λ),n=1 ,2,....Let ((λt)t≥0)n ∈ E(zn,λ n) (λ0 = λ)
be a sequence of equilibrium sequences of aggregate distributions that converges to (λt)t≥0. One
needs to show that (λt)t≥0 ∈ E(z,λ). To this end, I apply Lemma 4. I ﬁrst show (λt)t≥0 satisﬁes
(18). By the deﬁnition of weak convergence, for any bounded and continuous function f on



















f(g(a0,s 0,z,(λτ)τ≥0),s 0)Q(ds0,z 1,s 0,z 0)λ0(da0,ds 0).




















f(g(a0,s 0,z,(λτ)τ≥0),s 0)Q(ds0,z 1,s 0,z 0)λ0(da0,ds 0).




1A(g(a0,s 0,z,(λτ)τ≥0)Q(B,z1,s 0,z 0)λ0(da0,ds 0),
for any A × B ∈ B(A) ×B(S). Thus, Eq. (18) holds for t =0 . Similarly, one can derive that for
any t ≥ 1,λ t satisﬁes (18).
Finally, since each ((λt)t≥0)n satisﬁes (17), the limit (λt)t≥0 also satisﬁes (17). Thus, by
Lemma 4, (λt)t≥0 is an equilibrium sequence of aggregate distributions, i.e., (λt)t≥0 ∈ E(z,λ).
P r o o fo fL e m m a6 :
By a similar argument to that in Lemma 5, it suﬃces to show that ϕ has a closed graph.
This follows immediately from its deﬁnition and the fact that V is continuous and E is upper
hemicontinuous established in Lemma 5.
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2 :
I show that the tuple (((ai
t+1,c i
t)t≥0)i∈I,(rt,w t)t≥0) described below the statement of Theorem
2 in the main text constitutes a sequential competitive equilibrium. First, it is clear that given
prices (rt) and (wt), the ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts. Second, I verify the market clearing condition.
25Integrating with respect to the measure φ yields:


















=( 1 + rt)Kt + wtNt
= ztF(Kt,N t)+( 1− δ)Kt,
where the last equality follows from the construction of rt and wt and the homogeneity of F.
Finally, given the constructed sequence of aggregate distributions (λt)t≥0, by part (i) in Deﬁnition
2 and the principle of optimality, one can show that for any consumer i, (ai
t+1,c i
t)t≥0 is optimal.12
Moreover, the implied expected discounted utilities are given by v0(ai
0,s i
0,z 0,λ 0).
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 :
I ﬁrst construct a recursive equilibrium. I then show that for any sequential competitive equi-
librium (((ai
t+1,c i
t)t≥0)i∈I,(rt,w t)t≥0) with implied sequence of aggregate distributions µ∗, there
exists another payoﬀ equivalent sequential competitive equilibrium, that is generated by the
recursive equilibrium.
Step 1. By Lemma 4, there exist continuous functions V and g solving the dynamic pro-
gramming problem (16). By Theorem 1, a sequential competitive equilibrium exists. Thus the
correspondence ϕ deﬁn e di n( 1 9 )i sw e l ld e ﬁned. Since it is upper hemicontinuous by Lemma
6, it follows from [18] that there exists a measurable selection ξ from ϕ. Iu s eξ to construct a
recursive equilibrium with the expanded state space.






where A×B ∈ B(A)×B(S). Since by deﬁnition ξ(z,λ,v) is an equilibrium sequence of aggregate
distributions, it must satisfy (18) in Lemma 4. Thus, by the above construction of G(z,λ,v,z0),
G(z,λ,v,z0) is in fact the second component of the sequence of aggregate distributions ξ(z,λ,v).
Let λ0 = G(z,λ,v,z0). Thus, given the state (z,λ,v) today and the aggregate shock z0 tomorrow,
12See [33, Theorem 9.2]. Although the problem here is slightly diﬀerent, one can use a similar repeated substi-
tution method to prove the optimality.
26λ0 is the equilibrium aggregate distribution tomorrow. Deﬁne
Tv(z,λ,v)(a0,s 0,z0,λ 0)=V (a0,s 0,z0,ξ(z,λ,v)),
I claim that ((f,Tv,G),(r,w)) is a recursive equilibrium.
To verify this, one only needs to check part (i) in Deﬁnition 2 since part (ii)-(iv) are easily
veriﬁed. To this end, consider the following dynamic programming problem
V (a,s,z,ξ(z,λ,v)) = sup
a0∈Γ(a,s,z,λ)





By construction and Lemma 4, the policy function f(a,s,z,λ,v)=g(a,s,z,ξ(z,λ,v)) solves the
above problem. By the deﬁnition of ξ and ϕ in (19), and the above construction of Tv, problem
(24) can be rewritten as
v(a,s,z,λ)= s u p
a0∈Γ(a,s,z,λ)





This veriﬁes part (i) in Deﬁnition 2.
Step 2. Consider the sequential competitive equilibrium (((ai
t+1,c i
t)t≥0)i∈I,(rt,w t)t≥0) with
implied sequence of aggregate distributions µ∗. Let v0(ai
0,s i
0,z 0,λ 0)=V (ai
0,s i
0,z 0,µ ∗) be the
expected discounted utilities of consumer i. Then, one can use the argument after Theorem
2 in the main text to show that given the initial state ((ai
0,s i
0)i∈I,z 0,λ 0,v 0), the constructed
recursive equilibrium generates a sequential competitive equilibrium, in which each consumer i
has expected discounted utilities v0(ai
0,s i
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